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                                                            Abstract 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
  At the beginning of the twentieth century, US tobacco manufacturers were not 
forging ahead of their leading European counterparts in technology, productivity or 
managerial techniques. On some indicators, including per capita cigarette consumption, 
the USA strikingly lagged much of the rest of the world. Fiscal discrimination against 
cigarettes, amplified by the monopoly pricing, strategic choices, and organizational 
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          “Of all things American, nothing is more so than the cigarette,” wrote an 
enthusiastic booster of the addiction (with the assistance of the American Tobacco 
Company) in 1916.
1 The story of James Buchanan Duke, founder of the modern mass 
production industry, has been frequently told.
2 I shall follow my predecessors in treating 
cigarettes as a conventional economic “good”, eschewing the hindsight that the trillions 
of sticks sold killed millions of people. Despite this ending, the story has iconic status 
because it so clearly illustrates the application of the innovative Bonsack machine to the 
development of an essentially new product that was branded, advertised and marketed, 
nationally and internationally, to a standardized mass market of modern, urban 
consumers. Naturally, this is also a story of American leadership in the second industrial 
revolution, with the trust’s majority-controlled foreign subsidiary, BAT, becoming 
“among the most impressive American firms abroad.”
3 Duke’s “visible hand” triumphed 
over Germany (which betrayed its usual limited entrepreneurial response in branded 
packaged products) and the UK (whose Imperial Tobacco trust compromised its initial 
brand skills by perpetuating family management, rather than creating the professional 
management hierarchy that this archetypal modern industry required)
4. Key aspects of 
success were the economies of speed and forward vertical integration that Duke needed 
“to transform the high fixed costs that he had strategically incurred into low unit costs 
                                                 
1 Young, Story, p.4. 
2 Chandler, Visible Hand, pp.382-91; McCraw, Prophets, pp.72-3. 
3 Wilkins, Emergence, p. 91. 
 
4 Chandler,  Scale, pp. 247-249, 430-32.   4
and sustained competitive advantage.”
5 Duke’s peccadillo – no one is perfect - was to 
attempt to do the same in cigars, where brand proliferation and the absence of economies 
of scale prevented the replication of his “massive output” in cigarettes.
6 
          The power of this fable is underlined by its widespread acceptance by scholars with 
a more nuanced picture of the diversity of American demand and the complexity of 
entrepreneurial responses to it. Scranton acknowledges Duke’s achievement in meeting 
mass market demand in this quintessentially modern industry, before hastily moving on 
to products more congenial to his thesis.
7 A European critic of Chandlerian 
oversimplification merely notes that Bonsack licensed his machine in Britain first, before 
acknowledging that US cigarette production soon overhauled the UK’s, excusing British 
underperformance on account of the larger US market.
8 I labor these points, not to 
ridicule the storytellers, but to excuse myself. I have grumbled that a few facts do not fit 
this story, but I have often retold it.
9 
          The next section presents new evidence on the different reality that actually 
requires explanation: the puzzle of US backwardness in cigarettes, relative to Europe and 
Japan, before World War One. Following an examination of political and cultural factors 
in the slow progress of the cigarette, the next section concludes that the visible hand of 
American Tobacco, in the form of monopolistic output restriction, product differentiation, 
alternative investment priorities and strategic and organizational overload, likely played a 
                                                 
5 Lazonick, Business Organization, p. 241. 
6 Chandler, Visible Hand, p.390. 
7 Scranton, Endless Novelty, pp. 4, 354. 
8 Alford, Wills, p. 170. 
 
9 Hannah, “American Miracle;” Hannah and Wada, Miezaru.   5
role. A fourth section evaluates the sources of high productivity in tobacco manufacturing, 
in the USA and elsewhere, showing that Duke’s Bonsacks had only a modest walk-on 
part in a complex play. The final section reviews the reasons for the earlier misleading 
interpretations and further challenges for research presented by this, hitherto 
unrecognized, case of American backwardness. 
 
                                         National markets and tobacco taxes. 
 
               Tobacco was grown and used widely in Europe and Asia as well as on its native 
continent. Table 1 shows the impressive size of the world market and the annual 
manufactured tobacco consumption per head in the major industrial and industrializing 
economies and the largest underdeveloped economy before World War One. Broadly, the 
level of consumption per head (the second column) varied with income levels and 
tobacco taxes (the last two columns).The notion of a tobacco “tax” is problematic where 
there was a state-operated tobacco monopoly (as in Austria, France Italy and Japan) or a 
privately franchised state monopoly (as in Spain): I have adopted  Madsen’s 
contemporary adjustments of reported state profits (for tax collection costs, capital 
charges and so on) to arrive at tax-equivalents. Except in China, where the state barely 
functioned, tobacco taxes often dwarfed other elements of cost, and varied more than the 
other major cost, tobacco leaf. In the highest tax country, Italy, tobacco taxes were six 
times the American level and accounted for more than two-thirds of retail tobacco prices: 
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Table 1. The Determinants of National Tobacco Consumption ca.1912.    
                                      Consumption of          GDP per     Manufactured 
                                      manufactured           head       tobacco taxes 
                                      tobacco products                   ( USA=   (US cents 
                                             million        lbs. per          100)              per lb.) 
                                              lbs.             head 
      USA                         550          5.7                   100                  18 
       Germany                 252                3.8                   68                   17 
        Austria                       85                3.0                   41                    46 
France                        95                2.4                  68                    85                                                  
UK                           103                2.3                   92                    80   
        Spain                         41                 2.1                   38                  73 
        Russia                      236                1.5                29                   16 
        China                        600                1.4                   11                  2 
       Japan                         70                 1.4                 27             39 
        Italy                           43                 1.2                  47                  107 
Sources:Madsen, State, especially the statistical appendix, pp.214-255, with additional 
information from Anon, Tabako, vol. 4, pp. 682-684, 698 (Japan), ); Wolf, Tabak, p.102; 
Knoll, Deutsche Zigarettenindustrie, p. 137 (Germany); Todd, Statistics, p.8; Board of 
Trade, Third Report, pp. 215, 218 (UK); Nutter, Growth, p. 415, Peacock, Russian Year 
Book, pp. 503, 623; Sokolnikov, Soviet Policy, pp. 193, 205 (Russia); Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, Annual Reports 1913 and 1915;  Department of Commerce, Abstract, 
p.254 (USA). The Chinese figures are the author’s conjectural orders of magnitude 
(compare Commissioner, Tobacco, vol. 1, p. 62; Chen Han-Seng, Industrial Capital, pp. 
88, 95; Cox, Global Cigarette, pp. 157,173; Cochran, Big Business, p. 43; Wolf, 
“Tobacco Industry”, p. 91.) The data relate to calendar 1912 or the financial year 
1912/1913, except for Spain, where they relate to calendar 1913. GDP per head ratios and 
additional population data are from Maddison, World Economy.  Conversion of taxes in 
national currency units to US dollars is at average 1912 exchange rates.   
   7
this column is a proxy for international price differences. High prices explain the 
relatively low overall consumption levels in Italy, France and the UK, while low prices in 
the USA, Germany and China explain high sales, relative to incomes. 
               Traditional tobacco usages still dominated everywhere– the pipe in Japan, China 
and Britain, chewing tobacco in the rural USA, the more recent innovation of cigars in 
urban America, Germany and Italy – but cigarettes had been spreading rapidly. As Table 
2 shows, Russia remained the major producer of cigarettes, as in the hand-rolling era, 
when the cigarette fashion spread westwards from the Tsarist and Ottoman Empires. 
However, Spain, Germany, Austria and the UK were well ahead of the USA in cigarette 
consumption per head, despite their lower incomes, while American cigarette 
consumption languished below Japanese levels. An alternative measure of cigarette 
development - the percentage of all tobacco use in the form of the cigarette (the 
penultimate column in Table 2) - shows all large European economies and Japan ahead, 
though the USA retained a slight lead on China. 
            Some of this US “backwardness” is cultural. Americans chewed tobacco 
and smoking tobacco sales did not exceed chewing sales by weight until around 1908.
10 It 
seems reasonable to suppose that conversion to cigarettes was a larger step for Americans 
than the shift by Europeans and Asians from pipes and cigars. Yet when Americans did 
take to smoking, it was to cigars rather than cigarettes that they usually moved.  As late 
as 1912, cigars accounted for nearly six times as much leaf tobacco use as cigarettes in 
the USA and by value cigars accounted for more than all other tobacco sales combined.                       
 
                                                 
10 Robert, Story, p.274; Commissioner, Tobacco, vol. 3, pp.125, 135; Nicholls, Price Policies, pp. 9-11.   8
                       Table 2. The World’s Leading Cigarette Markets, ca.1912. 
                                  Cigarette Consumption            Cigarettes as a proportion     Price of 
                                        Total        Sticks per               of all manufactured            popular 
                                       (billion        head of                    tobacco sales.                 cigarette 
                                        sticks)      population.                (% by weight.)                  brand. 
                                                                                                                                (US cents 
                                                                                                                                   per 10.) 
     UK                           19.5                 428                            42                                4.1 
     Spain                          4.7                 238                           26                                3.1 
     Russia                       22.5                 235                        12-21                             1.5 
     Austria                       5.9                 205                            15                                4.6 
     Germany                   11.5                172                            10                                5.8  
     Japan                          7.4                 145                            23                               2.5 
     USA                          13.2                138                             5                                5.0 
     Italy                            3.4                  97                             17                              5.4  
     France                        3.7                  94                              9                               5.7  
     China                         10.2                24                              4                                2.0 
Sources: As Table 1. The third column is calculated by applying the standard industry 
assumption that one cigarette weighs one gram (or 15.43 grains avoirdupois) to the 
cigarette numbers in column 1 and dividing the result into column 1 of Table 1.  Actual 
cigarette weights varied by an (unknown) amount over time and between countries, but, 
where actual weight checks are available, they produce similar results. The most serious 
distortion is for Russian papyrosi (which were hollow for much of their length), where 
the lower additional figure in column 3 is Peacock’s direct weight estimate. The cigarette 
prices in the fourth column are for the leading contemporary brands (e.g. Gauloises in 
France, Shikijima in Japan) or, where there were grades rather than brands, the average 
for the most popular grade or, where no other information is available, the overall 
average 
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In Britain cigars were smoked on special occasions or by the elite (and were vastly 
outnumbered by cigarettes), but in the USA cigars dominated the smoking market. The 
fin de siècle British press image of the plutocratic Yankee with an expensive, fat cigar 
was a misleading caricature, not because of the expensive cigar, but because its smoker 
was not rich: merely an east coast city-dweller enjoying an everyday pleasure.  
            Another possible factor in the slow progress of the American cigarette was the 
cigarette prohibition movement: fifteen states prohibited the sale of cigarettes, while 
permitting other tobacco habits. However, these were states where cigarettes were little 
used and the laws were, in any case, sometimes not enforced, so this is unlikely to have 
been a major factor.
11 There are stronger clues to the differential progress of the cigarette 
in prices. The last column of Table 2 shows the retail price of popular cigarette brands 
before the First World War. These prices were, of course, originally at small coin “price 
points” in the national currencies – like the US price of a nickel for a pack of ten shown - 
but have been converted to cents (at average exchange rates for 1912) for ease of 
comparison. Low prices were clearly a key to high consumption in poorer countries like 
Russia, China and Japan, but the US price was, in a country used to cheap tobacco, a little 
higher than the West European average for cigarettes. The modest retail price of 
cigarettes in the UK explains some of that country’s fast rate of adoption. Consumers 
everywhere were willing to pay for the taste, convenience, modernity or higher level of 
finish of the cigarette, but the extra they had to pay varied. Cigarettes were around 75% 
more expensive per ounce than the cut pipe tobaccos that were the main alternative 
                                                 
11 Tate, Cigarette Wars; Alston et al., “Social Reformers;” Young, Story, pp.271-76.   10
preferred by British smokers.
12 In the USA, by contrast, cigarettes cost around four times 
as much as plug or smoking tobacco, weight for weight; in Japan, France and Austria 
they were respectively two, three and six times the price of the cut tobacco that was the 
main local alternative.
13  It appears that state tobacco monopolies (directly in their pricing 
policies) and internal revenue authorities (in their tobacco tax policies) showed some bias 
against what came to be seen as the modernization of tobacco taste. In Britain no tobacco 
leaf was grown domestically, so the most natural form of tobacco tax was a levy on leaf 
imports, which was, of course, inherently non-discriminatory between final uses.
14 
However the general practice was to tax the final products, facilitating bureaucratic or 
political discretion. This was, judging from the evidence on price relativities, used to 
deter the innovation of the cigarette in the USA and elsewhere. But non-tax factors were 
clearly also at work: Austria, for example, had higher cigarette consumption than the 
USA, despite an even more discriminatory tax differential. 
              The UK (the country where, Table 2 suggests, the cigarette had made most 
progress) had a price of just over four cents for ten Wills’ Woodbines (actually one 
English penny for a pack of five). High taxes accounted for just under half this UK 
cigarette price. Since US cigarette taxes were exactly a quarter of the American retail 
price, this implies that the ex-tax price of the trust’s Sweet Caporal brand was three-
                                                 
12 Prest and Adams, Consumers’ Expenditure, pp.89-90. 
13Commissioner, Tobacco, vol. 3, pp. 246, 267, 277, 284, 338; Madsen, State, pp. 220, 243, 249.   
14Germany also had a leaf tax (on both domestic production and imports), but supplemented it in 1906 with 
a cigarette consumption tax, so British tax neutrality cannot be considered completely accidental. 
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quarters higher than Woodbines.
15 The available cost accounts for these two brands are 
not directly comparable, but they do show there are three plausible explanations.
16 First, 
the British and Irish smoked smaller cigarettes, possibly containing a quarter less tobacco 
in the case of the brands in question.
17 Second, UK producers were further down the 
experience curve of large-scale manufacturing. By 1905 Woodbine - the mass market 
brand of one branch of Imperial Tobacco – was selling more sticks than all the US brands 
of the American Tobacco Company collectively.
18   Since almost all Imperial’s leaf was 
imported from America, lower raw material costs can be ruled out: if there was a British 
cost advantage, it was in manufacturing or selling costs. Third, the American Tobacco 
trust may have more thoroughly exploited its monopoly by restricting output and raising 
prices than Britain’s Imperial Tobacco Company. There is evidence that all three factors 
played a role. 
                The chronology of the USA’s falling behind in total sales of cigarettes is shown 
in Figure 1. The top line in the chart shows the expected pattern of steady sales growth in 
Russia, a mature cigarette economy, with demand primarily driven by rising real incomes, 
population and urbanization. As the cigarette fashion spread to America and 
                                                 
15 Woodbine cost accounts for 1900, up-rated by the 1909 duty increase, with allowance for reduced 
tobacco content and productivity increase, see Alford, Wills, pp. 245, 483. UK taxes were also payable on 
leaf purchase not product sale, so interest charges need to be added in comparing with US taxes. 
16 Ibid., pp.244-45; Commissioner, Tobacco, vol. 3, pp.154-78, 329-51. 
17 The average Wills cigarette in 1912 weighed 14.30 grains (Alford, Wills, pp. 476, 478) and Woodbines 
would have been below this; for  Sweet Caporal weights averaging  17.59 grains in a small 1899 New York 
sample, see Young, Story, p. 133. 
18 Alford, Wills, p.478; Commissioner, Tobacco, vol. 3, p.168.    12
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Sources: as Table 1. Prior to 1898 the US cigarette sales data include little cigars: I have 
arbitrarily assumed that little cigar sales grew by 30 million annually until backward 
extrapolation of the 1898 little cigar output of 457 million reaches zero, to derive a 
continuous US cigarette-only sales series. Data for German sales (and production, which 
was typically a few percent lower) are only available annually in the Statistisches 
Jahrbuch after the introduction of the cigarette tax in 1906. For prior years, I have 
interpolated missing years from the available statistics of production or sales in 1893, 
1897, 1903 and 1904. 
 
Western Europe, total sales might have been expected to grow faster than this, with 
growth tailing off to Russian levels as their markets matured. In the 1880s, only France 
(not shown on the graph) and the USA were well embarked on this growth curve, with 
similar early sales levels, but the French state monopoly soon dropped out of the race in 
machine-made cigarettes and concentrated on what the French called scaferlati: cut 
tobacco for the consumer to hand-roll cigarettes. The latecomers in machine-made 
cigarettes, Britain and Germany, only reached 1880s French and American levels of 
production in the mid-1890s. Both the British and the German markets then showed the   14
classic latecomer development pattern: growing much faster than Russia initially, but at 
similar rates as they mature. The United States also exhibited rapid growth in the 1880s, 
and was well ahead, but from 1896 cigarette sales stagnated, and were still below the 
1896 level in 1905. US cigarette sales were overtaken by the UK’s in 1898 and by 
Germany’s in 1901. 
 The chronology of US cigarette taxation correlates well with some of this. The 
tax of 0.05 cents per cigarette was raised to 0.1 cents in July 1897 and to a peak of 0.15 
cents in June 1898, and the differential with plug and other tobaccos was also then at its 
highest, as the federal government struggled to fund the Spanish-American War.
19  In 
July 1901, however, the tax was lowered to 0.108 cents per cigarette (0.054 cents on 
cheaper ones) and tax rates then remained stable until July 1910, when they were raised 
to a uniform 0.125 cents. Even before the 1897/8 tax increases, the trust, despite rapidly 
falling costs, abjured a policy of significantly lowering prices to expand demand.
20 The 
recovery after the July 1901 tax reductions was slow and mid-1890s sales levels were 
only exceeded when the trust’s contacts in government circles were making it clear, from 
1906 onwards, that it faced a serious federal antitrust threat.
21 The market response to the 
large but short-lived tax rises of 1897/98 (a 36% fall in sales between 1896 and 1901) 
was very different from the response, post-dissolution, to the smaller but permanent 1910 
                                                 
19 By 1898 the cigarette tax had tripled relative to mid-1890s levels, but taxes on plug and smoking tobacco 
only doubled; the later reductions restored the former tax levels in plug and smoking tobaccos 
(Commissioner, Tobacco, vol. 3, pp.51, 87, 155.) 
20 Between 1893 and 1899, manufacturing, selling, advertising and freight costs halved, saving almost as 
much as the increased tax, see Ibid., p. 155. 
21 Kolko, Triumph, pp.125-26.   15
tax rise (a 106% rise in sales between 1910 and 1913).
22 It is important, then, to examine 
the policies of the trust and the strategic context in which it formed them. 
                            
                                   The Strategies of the Trust. 
 
There is no good scholarly history of the leading companies in the tobacco trust 
and so our understanding of the firm’s core strategy has to be based on revealed 
behavior.
23 Duke’s journalistic biographer’s assertion that he “never entered a room 
where cigarettes were being smoked without a sniff of distaste” is, of course, unhistorical, 
but there is no reason to doubt its poetic truth.
24 Certainly Duke preferred to chew plug in 
his early days and graduated to cigars as he moved in the society circles of New York and 
London.
25 That Duke ignored colleagues’ advice in the mid-1890s and decisively shifted 
the American Tobacco Company’s domestic focus from cigarettes to other tobacco 
products is clear.
26 Duke himself stated that one of his motivations was genuine doubt 
about the future of the cigarette, though some have been inclined to suspect the serial 
monopolizer of lying to cover up his true intent.
27 This is not entirely implausible - he 
                                                 
22 Commissioner, Tobacco, vol. 3, pp.7, 155, 324. 
23 Anon., American Tobacco and Anon., Lorillard are slender volumes in more senses than one.  Tilley, R. 
J Reynolds, and Cox, Global Cigarette, are excellent, but deal with subsidiaries that were quite 
independently managed. Durden, Dukes, is balanced, but concentrates on the family rather than the firm. 
24 Winkler, Tobacco Tycoon, p.262. 
25 Durden, Dukes, p.59. 
26 Ibid., p.63. 
27 Tate, Cigarette Wars, p.32.   16
had a record of telling considerably less than the whole truth and of attempting to bribe 
witnesses –but even confirmed liars sometimes tell the truth.
28 
            Whatever his motives, Duke restricted the sales of cigarettes, in the textbook 
monopolistic manner, generating the profits required to finance diversification within, 
and the monopolization of, the whole manufactured tobacco industry. This was a bold, 
not to say foolhardy, plan, for, on its foundation in 1890 as a merger of five companies, 
the American Tobacco Company had around 90 per cent of US cigarette sales, but under 
5 per cent of all tobacco manufacturers’ sales revenue.
29 In its first major predatory 
pricing campaign, in plug, the trust lost $4.1 million between 1895 and 1898, though it 
also needed tens of millions more to acquire established plug companies: the additional 
capital had to come not just from current profits but from capital issues to investors lured 
by the prospect of future monopoly profits in cigarettes and, eventually, plug.
30 Duke 
floated the trust’s stock on the New York Stock Exchange in 1895 and then constrained 
domestic sales of mass-produced cigarettes in an attempt to rack up profits. Between 
1895 and 1904, independent manufacturers doubled their cigarette sales, while sales by 
the trust actually fell, reducing its market share from around 90% at the time of the initial 
merger to around 75%; but this contrast understates output restriction by the trust, which 
bought ten competing, independent manufacturers in the years around the turn of the 
century. If these independents had maintained their market share, the trust’s share of the 
US cigarette market would have declined to around 56% in 1906, implying a halving of 
                                                 
28 Moody, Long Road, pp. 156-159, 204; Industrial Commission, Report, pp.317-28. 
29 Ibid., vol. 1, p.325, vol. 2, pp.8, 242; Durden, Dukes, p.58; Department of Commerce, Abstract, p.700. 
30 Burns, “Outside Intervention;” Commissioner, Tobacco, vol. 2, pp. 71-76; vol. 3, pp.51, 155.   17
the original trust’s core sales in ten years.
31 Clearly the trust was the major force 
restricting output for the domestic market in this period. The average wholesale cigarette 
price charged by the trust rose almost every year for more than a decade after 1897.
32 
             By 1900, the unexpected combination of the tax squeeze with the trust’s own 
output restriction was devastating. Cigarette profits could no longer support Duke’s still 
expanding predatory pricing ambitions in snuff, cigars and overseas markets. Fortunately 
his gamble in plug had paid off: in that year plug profits were rising rapidly, as the new 
monopoly was consolidated; two years later they were nearly seven times domestic 
cigarette profits. Cigarettes were by then making even lower profits than the trust’s newly 
organized snuff subsidiary, and snuff, not cigarettes, was the most rapidly growing 
tobacco product category between 1895 and 1910.
33 It is conceivable that trust managers, 
despite their experience of the success of cheap cigarettes abroad, considered them as a 
niche, rather than mass market product at home.  
             Such a conjecture is compatible with the marked change in branding strategy for 
cigarettes. At the end of the nineteenth century, American Tobacco muted the mass 
market strategy for which its fablers lauded it, and re-focused on a policy of strong 
product differentiation and a move to the luxury end of the smoking market. The trust’s 
top-selling Sweet Caporal brand (which had 50 % of the US market in 1898) was allowed 
to go into free fall, with a proliferation of new domestic cigarettes like Piedmont and new 
blended brands like Mecca gaining share at a variety of prices and higher manufacturing 
                                                 
31Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 228-31, 329-33, with allowances for pre-1898 little cigar output as in Figure 1. 
32Ibid., vol. 3, pp.155, 327. 
33 Ibid., vol. 3, pp.51, 138-39, 155. Contemporaries bracketed cigarettes and snuff together as the 
unimportant branches of the industry, see Ibid., vol.1, p. 50.   18
costs.
34 The initial thrust of Duke’s attempt to increase appropriation of consumers’ 
surplus by price discrimination came in his promotion of Turkish cigarettes, using 
substantial quantities of expensive, imported dark tobacco. These had previously been 
largely the preserve of immigrant hand-rolling workshops in New York, but Duke used 
partially mechanized techniques to increase his market share from 1% to 60% in this 
sector over a decade. He specialized in the cheaper end, where his cigarettes were known 
derisively as “imitation Turkish” in the trade, which attached some importance to hand-
rolled quality. His factories were smaller than for mass-produced cigarettes, and some 
machinery could not be used: for example, Turkish cigarettes were usually oval rather 
than round, and packing had to be done by hand. The prize was higher prices and profits 
from selling a luxury rather than mass market product: many Turkish cigarettes sold at a 
premium price of a dime to a quarter for ten, twice the price of mass market brands or 
more. The average price of the trust’s cigarettes in 1901 was 1% above the basic price of 
Sweet Caporal; by 1910 the product differentiation strategy was so successful that the 
average trust cigarette price was 26% above this cheap brand. The trust’s Turkish sales 
(1.7 billion sticks in 1910) were well below American-style cigarettes (5.2 billion), but its 
Turkish profit per stick was more than double that on an American cigarette. However, 
the smaller, independent, and also partly-mechanized Turkish manufacturers, like Philip 
Morris (a tiny, then British, firm that had set up a New York factory in 1902), had lower 
unit costs. There were few scale economies in Turkish cigarettes, but with the trust’s 
reduced sales and restrained advertising of mass market cigarettes, such product 
                                                 
34Ibid., vol. 3, pp.16, 162-3.   19
differentiation at the luxury end remained profitable for the trust and even more 
profitable for small-scale producers.
35 
             In this context, the trust’s parallel move into cigars appears not as the unfortunate 
exception that proves the rule of the triumph of the mass-produced American cigarette, 
but as an integral part of Duke’s strategy of moving toward more differentiated, higher 
priced, smoking products. It was also a direct and urgent response to a major competitive 
threat: cigars could hardly be peripheral to the trust’s market stance, because the US cigar 
manufacturers outside the trust had carried all before them, while cigarette sales were 
restricted.  By 1901 big cigars (which five years earlier had sold in comparable numbers 
to cigarettes) outsold cigarettes by three to one. The cigarette’s position in America might 
well have appeared hopeless: it apparently was difficult to sell as a luxury in competition 
with big cigars that cost at least a nickel: ten times the cigarette price per stick. Cigars 
had become the core of the US market for convenience smoking and this part of the 
industry remained highly competitive. The trust at its peak had only 16% of US 
production; there were more than 20,000 other US cigar manufacturers, and their 
aggregate profits exceeded the trust’s own profits from all tobacco products.
36 As with 
                                                 
35 Winkler, Tobacco Tycoon, p. 258; Young, Story, pp.57, 91; Kluger, Ashes, pp.49-51; Commissioner, 
Tobacco, vol. 1, pp.173, 228, 332, 334, vol. 2, pp.172-3, vol. 3, pp.155, 168, 173-78, 331, 339-51, 439-50. 
 
36 The 1904 domestic tobacco profits of the trust were under $27 million (ibid, vol. 2, pp. 26, 30, 33).The 
Bureau of Corporations was coy about independent cigar makers’ profits, perhaps because they include 
returns to labor as well as capital, perhaps because (unlike the other independents whose profits they did 
report) they did not fit the Bureau’s  pre-conceived theories, but we can deduce they were considerably 
higher, by deducting from the 1904 census figure for value added in cigars, the relevant taxes, wages  and   20
Turkish cigarettes, the cigar’s triumph was facilitated by the market distortions created by 
the trust itself. If there were significant price cross-elasticities between cigars and other 
tobacco products, the trust’s move to monopoly pricing in the minority of the industry it 
controlled would increase cigar sales: that, indeed, seems to have happened. 
             Duke’s ambitions for changing this unfavorable and unfamiliar balance of 
competitive advantage by mechanizing the production of the differentiated products on 
which the trust increasingly focused were very real. He succeeded in partially 
mechanizing the production of Turkish cigarettes and little cigars, building up market 
shares of, respectively, 60% and 75% in these sectors. His investment in his own in-
house tobacco machinery manufacturing company under Rufus L. Patterson, a young 
engineer hired in 1898, is a good example of the long-term, but inherently uncertain, 
payoffs from technology planning by the “visible hand”, seeking not merely to react to 
external developments, but actively to shape the industry’s future. Bonsack’s earlier 
experimentation cost a few thousand dollars, but Patterson spent an astounding $7-8 
millions on the cigar machinery project over more than two decades, making it arguably 
the largest and longest sustained of US R&D programs at that time
37. There were severe 
technical problems both in bunching the filling (already achieved for small cigars by 
molds) and in wrapping it in natural leaf (much harder to manipulate than uniform 
                                                                                                                                                 
the trust’s cigar profits (ibid,  vol. 1, pp.149, 427-30, vol. 3, pp. 182, 192, 195, 197, 201; Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, Annual Report 1910, p. 109; Department of Commerce, Abstract,p.470) 
37 Before the Frascati rules, R&D expenditure comparisons are fraught with difficulty, but, taking the lower 
figure and averaging over twenty-six years, this is $270,000 per year, a sum not equaled by US chemical 
and electrical firms before World War One, compare Mack, Cigar Manufacturing Industry, p. 52 and Anon, 
“Rufus Lenoir Patterson,” p.56 with Hounshell and Smith, Science, p.14 and Reich, Making, p.80.     21
cigarette paper). Nonetheless, he did by 1915 come up with a workable prototype for 
machinery that, fifteen years later, was to be producing most American cigars.
38 That was, 
of course, too late for the trust, which had also lost more than $4 million on fruitless 
predatory pricing in cigars in 1902-1903 alone, and never made profits in the cigar sector 
at the level of its monopoly businesses. But the trust was no more able than Microsoft 
today to contemplate the possibility that the contrast between its high core profits and its 
high losses in new areas (where others made large profits) might betoken past good luck 
(in cigarettes), rather than current wasted investment (in cigars). American Tobacco’s 
commitment was serious and sustained, as it waited patiently for its research engineers to 
deliver. It continued to employ 37,000 people in cigar manufacturing and retailing, ten 
times its domestic mass-produced cigarette workforce, and invested more in cigar assets 
and brand building, where it showed every sign of seeing its future, using recovering 
cigarette profits after the 1901 tax cut as a “cash cow” to fund this core strategy.
39 
          The managerial strains on Duke’s organization of a massive and rapid increase in 
corporate size, as he expanded beyond the small (and apparently declining) cigarette 
industry into the large, growing and diverse plug, cigar and snuff sectors, must have been 
considerable. In the early 1890s he had controlled a specialist cigarette and smoking 
tobacco organization of only a few thousand employees and several million dollars sales, 
but the tobacco trust he created in the early twentieth century employed 100,000 and had 
                                                 
38 Cox, Competition, pp.50-54; Mack, Cigar Manufacturing Industry, pp.55-6; Baer, Economic 
Development, pp. 197-201; Commissioner, Tobacco, vol. 1, pp.151, 289-90. 
39Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 33, 272-278, 286-288, vol 3, pp. 51, 87, 129, 139, 155, 182, 195, 198, 202, 230; Anon., 
American Tobacco, p.3.   22
sales of $125 millions.
40 This both required a quite different order of management skills 
and shifted the management hierarchy’s focus to the 95% of activities that now lay 
outside the domestic cigarette business, especially as plug and snuff manufacturing were 
more manager-intensive than cigarettes.
41 The suggestion that the 250 highly diverse 
companies in the group were efficiently centrally managed by the cigarette combine’s 
head office at 111 Fifth Avenue (whereas the British Imperial group, with one-twentieth 
that number of organizational units and one-sixth its number of employees, was merely a 
loose federation) is fantasy.
42 Both groups imposed central costing standards, and both 
hired professional managers, but finance and advertising expenditures were more 
centrally controlled at Imperial.
43 Both allowed some separate selling organizations in 
subsidiaries, though the British may have been more inefficiently indulgent in this 
respect.
44  Family heirs were also more apparent in British top management, though it 
should be noted that a quite powerful reason that Duke’s employment of his family was 
restricted to his own generation, breaching the family tradition, was that he did not have a 
son or son-in law (and he could not even stand the idea of women smoking, never mind 
managing). Significantly, he used many ex-family managers – the most obvious source of 
experienced tobacco professionals and sometimes a lever to gain agreement to merger 
terms - to administer his sprawling empire. Early on, names such as Ginter and Kinney 
                                                 
40 Winkler, Tobacco Tycoon, p.116; Commissioner, Tobacco, vol. 2, pp. 139, 182, 242. 
41Ibid., vol. 1, p. 51, for their higher ratios of salaries to wages than the cigarette sector. 
42Ibid., vol. 2,  p.248; Tennant, American Cigarette Industry, p.6; Chandler, Strategy, p. 40.  For the 
contrary view, see Chandler, Scale, pp.247-49. 
43Ibid., p. 386; Alford, Wills, p.309-10, 319; Commissioner, Tobacco, vol. 2. 
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had disappeared from the senior management ranks, but later, as management strains 
multiplied, names like Lorillard, Helme, Drummond, Alvarez, Ogden, and Murai were 
necessarily retained. When the time came to move on, he chose the Hill dynasty, with its 
highly personal management style, to succeed him at American Tobacco and a son-in-law 
of the Wills family to succeed him at BAT. He certainly, like Imperial, established a 
central leaf buying department, but, unlike Imperial, he allowed many branches and 
subsidiaries to do their own purchasing of leaf.
45 Whereas Imperial directly owned all the 
assets of its constituents and dissolved their separate companies, Duke usually preserved 
the corporate form of subsidiaries and sometimes allowed the retained family managers 
to continue as minority stockholders (for example, the Reynolds family retained a third of 
R. J. Reynolds when it joined the trust) or, in the case of American Snuff, even as 
majority stockholders (ATC held only 43 % of the shares). As his family biographer 
generously notes, it is just possible that he was telling the truth when he testified that he 
wished he had done more of this.
46  
             Managing these giant firms, even the most bombastic business leader (and Duke 
had no Imperial rivals for that title) was doubtless tempted to leave alone subsidiaries that 
were not causing problems, while focusing on those where technical, legal or market 
pressures required urgent attention. Several ATC subsidiaries were secretly controlled (to 
dupe competitors or unions), so management there had to be at arm’s length. Despite 
Duke’s public statements to the contrary, the complex, inter-related structures of the 
American, Continental, Consolidated and Lorillard holding companies were, in some 
                                                 
45 ibid., vol. 1, pp. 252, 255-56; vol. 2, pp. 277-78. 
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respects, centrally managed. Then the Northern Securities decision of 1904 induced a 
tightened organization, under a new holding company, American Tobacco. Thereafter the 
core subsidiaries that were treated by the Commissioner of Corporations as centrally 
managed accounted for a similar proportion of the trust’s business as the dominant Wills 
branch of Imperial that was managed from its Bristol headquarters.
47 In difficult and 
novel circumstances, both firms were feeling their way – experimentally, unseeingly and 
with intermittent success - to a more efficient organization, but, on the face of it, the 
British were initially making a better job of it, whether judged by business outcomes or 
by the degree of managerial integration. This was not necessarily because Britons were 
better managers, rather, perhaps, luckier strategists, who had not bitten off more than they 
could chew. Wills had driven its rapid growth internally by focusing clearly on cigarettes, 
and its consolidation of smaller competitors into Imperial in 1901/2 little more than 
doubled its own capital; whereas the American Tobacco acquisitions around the turn of 
the century involved seven-fold capital growth and mainly in tobacco sectors unfamiliar 
to Duke.
48  
               It is frustrating that we have no reliable account of internal management 
decision-making while these managerial stresses of exceptionally rapid corporate growth 
were being absorbed by Duke’s loose agglomeration of disparate companies, but it is 
plausible that strategic thinking suffered. The board had some Wall Street heavyweights, 
but they may have been focused on private enrichment from insider dealing at the 
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expense of stockholders rather than strategy for cigarette development.
49 The years 
around the turn of the century were years of corporate deal-making, financial 
restructurings, new capital issues, multiple acquisitions, and overseas adventures that 
must have absorbed a considerable amount of the twelve hour days that Duke reputedly 
put into management. The enormous size of the commitment to cigars and its failure to 
yield results parallel to those in other tobacco sectors clearly preoccupied senior 
management. It is possible that the failure to promote mass market cigarettes in this 
period, especially after the 1901 tax reductions, was simply a case of managerial overload. 
Some of these problems were resolved by 1905, when Duke also passed on his 
international responsibilities for BAT to a colleague, though his own excruciating divorce 
that year, burgeoning interest in his family’s non-tobacco investments, and the brewing 
antitrust problems cannot have helped any time management problems. Whether a desire 
to modify the trust’s perceived monopolistic behavior, a resolution of the severe 
managerial strains of rapid diversification, learning through BAT from British experience 
in cigarettes, or some other unknown factor caused the trust from around 1907 to resume 
its role as the main contributor to cigarette sales growth in the USA, catching up by 1910 
with aggregate German sales levels (see Figure 1), is currently unknown. 
            Monopolists do, of course, have more managerial discretion than most 
businessmen and Duke used it to the full. Whether he maximized profits is moot, since 
strategic plays like cigars produced poor returns, but it would be a brave historian who 
second-guessed the choices made by a man who became immensely wealthy and was, 
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with pardonable exaggeration, dubbed by a colleague “the greatest merchant in the 
world.”
50 Duke’s refusal to be drawn into selling cigarettes at under a nickel for ten, 
except selectively in the south and to deter entry, prevented most Americans having an 
option that many overseas smokers enjoyed, but was arguably a profit-maximising 
strategy, especially in the east coast urban markets on which his product differentiation 
campaigns were focused.
51 The common stockholders in the 1890 merger (mainly Duke 
and his associates: the public largely held preferred stock and bonds) had by 1908 
enjoyed a monopolist’s return, in income and capital gains, some three times that on the 
average manufacturing stock.
52 It may be that no plausible strategy of exploiting 
consumers and passive investors (other than the impractical commandment “thou must 
always foresee everything perfectly and be right”) would have been more personally 
profitable than the one Duke chose. 
There is a possible defense, in broader terms, of his strategic shift to product 
differentiation: that, in what was one of the wealthiest economies of the time, mass 
production and marketing of cigarettes was inappropriate. Diversity of taste in tobacco – 
in plug, snuff, cigars or Turkish cigarettes – could be seen as one of the fruits of wealth: a 
symptom of the choices offered by American economic success, not a signal of failure. 
But two obvious counterfactuals suggest doubts about this.  First, the UK offered an 
alternative vision of much more rapid conversion of tobacco users to the cigarette, 
combined with a more wholehearted pursuit of mechanized mass production and low 
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prices, rather along the lines the fablers exaggeratedly credited to Duke. Wills pursued a 
less monopolistically exploitative and more cigarette-focused strategy. Its cigarette prices 
were lower than ATC’s and this enabled it to maintain its UK cigarette market share 
around 53% between 1895 and 1901 by rapid internal growth (without mergers), while its 
market share in other manufactured tobacco declined to a mere 5%
53. Its low price, high 
volume strategy produced a profit rate and absolute profits higher than the trust’s in 
cigarettes, though (operating in a high-tax tobacco market less than one-fifth the size of 
the USA’s) its total profits were less.
54 
              American consumers may not have liked the small, unflavored Woodbines that 
Wills successfully sold in the UK: British snobs also apologized for Virginia (“Sorry, it’s 
only a Virgin”) when not offering an up-market Turkish cigarette. Yet the British-
Virginia cigarette sold well, in larger sizes, in Australia.
55 The British threat to build 
cigarette factories in the USA was forestalled for a quarter century by Duke’s offer of the 
1902 BAT merger, but events after the 1911 break up of the trust reinforce the suggestion 
that a variant of the British mass market strategy might have worked earlier in the USA. 
In the next fifteen years, free of Duke’s control, US cigarette sales grew nearly four times 
faster than in the previous fifteen years and already by the late1920s the USA matched 
British 1912 levels of cigarette consumption per head.
56 This transformation was initially 
driven by the Camel brand. Camels were launched in July1913 by R. J. Reynolds, a 
medium-sized successor company explicitly excluded by Duke from cigarettes. 
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Extraordinarily (it is rare for a new entrant’s new brand to capture an established market 
so quickly), Camels were within two years selling more than any previous US cigarette 
brand and within four years had nearly 40% of the, already much larger, US cigarette 
market.
57 A significant feature of this success, besides a return to high Virginia tobacco 
content in the mass production of domestic blended cigarettes and a slightly lower price 
in real terms, was a massive increase in advertising. Duke had advertised extensively in 
the early days, but had suppressed advertising of mass market cigarettes to modest levels 
after attaining a monopoly.
58 In this environment, the revealed preferences of consumers 
for heavily advertised and expensive cigars and Turkish cigarettes cannot be taken as 
unambiguous indicators of exogenous taste differences. We should be cautious in 
assuming it would have been more profitable for Duke to behave as the fablers thought 
he did (or as the British actually did), though more open to the possibility that it might 
have been preferred by American consumers. The verdict delivered by post-1911 US 
smokers, when new entry and competition facilitated freer explorations of their 
consumption possibility frontier, lends some credence to that view. 
 
                                 Mechanization and Productivity. 
 
It is difficult to find words that adequately describe the richly varied panoply of 
American tobacco enthusiasms before World War One, but the adjective that is most 
frequently used in the historical literature on international productivity differences is 
                                                 
57 Tennant, American Cigarette Industry, pp. 75-78. 
58 Commissioner, Tobacco, vol. 3, p.164.   29
“European”. In the United States, we are told, “(t)he extraordinary development of mass 
production … would hardly have been possible without its vast national market, its 
relatively egalitarian income distribution, and the unparalleled willingness of its 
immigrant consumers to accept standardized substitutes for traditional products.”
59 By 
contrast, textbook Europeans are supposed to have held stubbornly to archaic regional 
tastes (plug? snuff?) and reinforced class divisions in consumption (cigars? Turkish 
cigarettes?), rather than embracing the standardization of consumption (Camels?) of the 
melting pot. In tobacco, the American melting pot operated in these pre-war years at an 
extremely low temperature. The British and Irish brought their taste for Virginia (or what, 
in their newly adopted language, they learned to call “bright tobacco”) cigarettes, 
southern Europeans liked dark tobacco, and Russians and Californian Asians preferred 
papyrosi (cigarettes with a hollow cardboard mouthpiece where the filter tip now is, 
manufactured by the trust in San Francisco), but Italians and Germans opted for cigars, 
while Swedes took snuff, and they all, together with Greeks and Turks, brought varied 
craft skills in tobacco as well as varied tastes. Whatever it was that Borden, Campbell, 
Heinz, Kellogg and their like did to the tastes of immigrants in food (and I suspect that is 
exaggerated, too), American Tobacco signally failed to do in tobacco. On top of that, 
many native-born Americans refused to pander to new-fangled, foreign tastes and stuck 
to navy-plug, flat-plug, or fine-cut. The result was a pattern of consumption that has been 
held in Europe to explain low productivity. It is worth considering whether that was also 
the outcome in US tobacco manufacturing. 
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There are three relevant estimates of comparative productivity for the period 
before World War One. Broadberry’s study of physical productivity differences (based 
on census data on tobacco manufactured) found US tobacco productivity in 1909 8% 
higher than the UK in 1907 and 1% below it (with a similar two-year lag) in 1914.
60 
Zitzewitz developed a time series for the same two countries’ tobacco manufacturing, 
beginning in 1879, that showed British productivity, defined in terms of value-added, 
overtaking the US in the early twentieth century.
61 Finally, I have suggested a reworking 
of Madsen’s data for 1912 to produce productivity estimates for a wider range of 
countries (Table 3). The raw data on weight of tobacco manufactured per employee, 
normalized on the USA = 100 (the first column of the table), shows Germany lagging, 
but otherwise little trace of the normal US manufacturing leadership.
62 
               These productivity calculations make some heroic assumptions and there is 
room to debate the differences among the results, but the remarkable thing about them - 
and about all countries in Table 3 - is the uniformity of outcomes. It should be recalled 
that at this time the typical American manufacturing worker produced about twice as 
much as the average British or German worker, three times as much as the average 
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                            Table 3. Productivity in Manufactured Tobacco, ca. 1912. 
 
                                         Output per person employed (to the base USA = 100) 
                                        Weight               Labor              Product               Both 
                                             of               “Quality”           Quality          Adjustments     
                                         Output          Adjustment      Adjustment          
                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                  
 
      France                           185                     208                134                    151 
 
     Australia                        121                       na                 117                      na 
 
     UK                                 118                     127                 155                   166 
 
     Canada                           105                       na                   na                      na 
 
     USA                               100                     100                 100                    100 
 
     Italy                                 89                      101                 152                    174 
 
     Austria                            84                         95                 99                      112 
 
     Spain                              74                         84                  98                      111 
 
     Japan                              71                         74                  54                        56 
 
     Germany                        49                         52                  92                        98 
 
Sources: Hannah, “Competition,” for col.1; as Table 1 for cols. 2-4. The denominator is 
all persons employed, including operatives, staff and the self-employed. Col.2 assumes 
that the wage differential between men and women operatives reflected 50% gender 
prejudice and 50% lower productivity (see text and note 65) and adjusts the denominator 
for the latter only. Col. 3 would ideally use specific country-pair value added to adjust for 
product mix, but attempts to derive value added from national gross output values, except 
for the USA where the data are unusually good, reflect the assumptions made 
(particularly on leaf costs by product and the division between profits and taxes in state 
enterprises), rather than meaningful national price/quantity ratios. However, the value 
added in cigars and cigarettes was generally higher than in snuff, plug or cut tobacco. Col. 
3 simply revalues the 1912 product weights for all countries by the ex-tax value-
added/weight ratios implicit for the USA in 1909 in Table 4, i.e. by $1.59 per lb for 
cigars, 99c for cigarettes, 26c for snuff and 12c for other tobacco. This would be 
especially misleading for Germany (where cigars – judging by price, mainly of low 
quality - accounted for 62% of output weights) and Italy (similarly, with 44%), against a 
median cigar share of only 13%. For those two countries only, cigar output is valued at 
the cigarette rate, but this possibly still flatters their output quality.    32
French worker, ranging up to nearly nine times in the case of the Japanese.
63 The output-
per-person-year figure for tobacco, by contrast, is everywhere in the same ballpark: this 
was an industry in which, remarkably, the whole world was developed, or was as near to 
that outcome as we are likely to find.
64 (Perhaps more accurately, the whole world was 
underdeveloped, because, even in the USA, most tobacco manufacturing, notably cigars, 
was still done by handicraft - or modestly mechanized – processes. Even standard 
cigarettes were still profitably hand-made in low income regions of Cuba, Saxony or 
Iberia). The USA did not show its normal early twentieth century pattern of forging 
ahead, and this is particularly surprising in that in America this was still (just, at 52%) 
largely men’s work, whereas tobacco operatives in the rest of the world, and especially in 
Latin countries, were predominantly female: around 95 % in Italy and Spain and 87% in 
France. Both the high productivity of Frenchwomen and the power of male-dominated 
unions in US cigar manufacturing suggest caution in inferring, from men’s wages 
everywhere being around twice those paid to women, that men were more productive, 
though, where women were less skilled, less experienced and earned less at piecework, 
their productivity was clearly lower.
65 The second column makes an adjustment for this 
on the assumption that half the wage differential was due to gender prejudice and shows 
the USA in even poorer light. Nor does the further adjustment for product quality in the 
last two columns fundamentally change the USA’s mediocre productivity ranking. If the 
whole world was developed, it seems reasonable to characterize this – as our earlier 
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analysis also suggests - as a consequence of US tobacco manufacturers behaving badly, 
rather than because the rest of the world did particularly well. 
 However, the country that forged ahead of the pack in Table 3 - France – had a 
tobacco industry with characteristics that, in other contexts, have usually been described 
as American. France had the most standardized output of any country in the table:  
scaferlati (cut tobacco for pipes and home-rolled cigarettes) and the cigarettes made from 
such tobacco accounted for 81% of production by weight and 76% by value.
66 It also had 
one of the most professionally managed, long-established and centralized management 
hierarchies in an industry which in many countries, including the USA, was still in the 
hands of small, medium and large family firms, only just beginning to experience 
bureaucratization and the divorce of ownership from control. The French Régie had for 
long recruited on merit by competitive examination, and employed some of France’s top 
engineers from the grandes écoles in senior management positions.
67 
 The precocious performance of the Japanese state monopoly should also be 
noted: it had vastly reduced the normal nine-fold US productivity advantage, half a 
century before that was approached by other Japanese manufacturing industries. As in 
France, demand was relatively standardized, though Japanese cut tobacco (77% of 1912 
output by weight) was still mainly smoked in the traditional long-stemmed, small-bowled 
kiseru, and was finer cut than the tobacco used in cigarettes.
68 The Japanese tobacco 
manufacturing monopoly had been established as recently as 1904, by bureaucrats 
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knowledgeable of French achievements, following the established Meiji era habit of 
copying the best in the West (the local model provided by Duke’s Japanese subsidiary 
was explicitly rejected). The Monopoly Bureau of the Ministry of Finance recruited well 
qualified engineering and law graduates from the top imperial universities: the head of 
the Bureau in 1912, Osachi Hamaguchi, was a graduate of Todai and a future prime 
minister of Japan. Within several years, the Bureau substantially raised prices and 
revenues, concentrated its consequently stagnant output on large factories and nearly 
doubled the productivity level that had been achieved under private management. 
However, contemporary complaints that standardization of demand by state monopolies 
failed to match consumer preferences and the ambiguous impact of the imperfect product 
quality adjustments in Table 3 suggest that more research would be advisable before 
inferring the general superiority of the socialist “visible hand.”
69 
             Countries like Germany, whose capitalist producers specialized in cigars, found it 
difficult to match productivity in countries like Britain and France, which concentrated 
on cigarettes and smoking tobaccos. The US failure to forge ahead can also be traced to 
the influence of the cigar. Table 4 disaggregates the US tobacco industry’s value added 
and employment for 1909 into four specialist product sectors; disaggregated physical 
output data is also available for that census year. Cigar manufacturing accounted for over 
three-quarters of the labor in US tobacco manufacturing and labor productivity in cigars 
(in terms of value added or physical output) was markedly lower than in other sectors. 
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                                  Table 4. Productivity in US Tobacco Manufacturing, 1909.    
                          Number of              Value-added per                Physical output 
                        wage-earners.              wage-earner                    per wage-earner                             
                                                                                                  
                                                          Inc. tax    Ex. tax    
Cigars                  129,518                    $999        $839                          528lbs. 
Chewing and 
Smoking Tobacco  24,338                $2,895     $1,911                      16,581lbs. 
Cigarettes                 8,159                $3,097     $2,243                        2,258lbs. 
Snuff                        1,698                $5,356     $4,357                      16,689lbs. 
 Sources: employment and value-added data are from Department of Commerce, Abstract, p.470; tax 
adjustment and physical output data from Commissioner, Tobacco, vol. 3, pp. 49, 51, 84, 87, 127, 129, 
138-9, 153, 155, 181-2, 192, 194, 440, 442; and Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Annual Report 1914, 
p.150. 98% of the wage-earners (those enumerated in column 1) were in factories specializing in the four 
main product categories shown, to which the value-added data in the next column conform, and are the 
denominator in all the productivity calculations. However, data for the tax adjustment in column 3 and the 
physical output in the numerator of column 4 additionally include the 3,097 tobacco workers (2% of the 
workforce) in mixed product factories, and relate to a differently defined year. This may bias the results in 
the last two columns. 
 
                      The US cigar sector did no better in physical productivity terms than 
Germany’s, though it did better in terms of value added per worker, but it was US                      
performance in other sectors that enabled it to outpace Germany. Burns has usefully 
drawn attention to the wide range of mechanization and productivity improvements in 
plug, smoking tobacco and snuff.
70 The data in Table 4 confirm both the quantitative 
significance in the USA of these sectors’ employment levels and their favorable 
productivity performance (higher in physical productivity terms and not much below 
cigarettes in value-added terms). Burns also particularly lauds the trust for achieving 
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economies of scale and production efficiencies by concentrating manufacture of these 
products into fewer, larger factories. However, the survivor technique evidence that he 
uses cannot refute the alternative hypothesis that large bureaucracies like American 
Tobacco prefer larger factories for their administrative tidiness, or, more charitably, as a 
way of neutralizing the managerial diseconomies of scale inherent in enormous 
enterprises. 
             It seems perverse, moreover, to credit the trust with the major contribution to 
productivity improvements in a sector where productivity growth had been very rapid in 
the earlier period of vigorous competition between family-owned firms in chewing and 
smoking tobacco and snuff, when a wide range of new tobacco machinery was being 
adopted. As Burns candidly notes, “the independent manufacturers were rather highly 
concentrated in 1897”: that is before the trust bought most of them in the following five                    
or so years, thus turning a series of specialty oligopolies into a diversified near-                       
monopoly.
71  We can measure productivity growth in this sector (manufactured tobacco 
other than cigars and cigarettes), in the period of family control in the nineteenth century 
(when efficient firms with large plants were gaining share largely by internal growth) and 
in the later period when the trust was digesting them (further concentrating output into 
fewer, even larger plants). Value added per worker increased by an outstanding 119% in 
1879-89; by a, still impressive, 92% in 1889-99; but by something nearer the average for 
US manufacturing - 28% - in 1899-1909.
72 In other words, the trust brought the initially 
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high rate of productivity growth, driven by mechanical innovations induced by 
competition between its predecessors, down to modest levels, indulging in some 
bureaucratic tidying up. Even the modest productivity increase in the decade of trust 
control may have been illusory: the recorded increase in “value added” probably derived 
more from increased monopoly profits than from enhanced efficiency.
73 
The fable leads us to believe that America led in cigarette productivity, but there, 
too, the picture was mixed. US cigarette productivity (see Table 4) was, in physical 
output terms, lower than other sectors (except cigars), though it commanded a high price, 
relative to weight, than many tobacco products, so its value added per worker was 
slightly greater than for smoking and chewing tobaccos. The new cigarette technology 
palpably added value: Bonsacks were remarkable machines to watch and rarely failed to 
enthrall the economic tourists of their day.
74 In 1890 Duke had been willing to pay over 
to the Bonsack Machine Company one-twelfth of his initial cigarette profits for exclusive 
use of the machine, so he evidently rated it highly.
75 It was also constantly being 
improved: early best outputs of 200 cigarettes per minute, already more than twice that of 
rival machines, were by 1913 up to 450 as standard. Yet cigarette machines were a case 
of multiple, simultaneous invention and were easy to manufacture. Bonsacks were only 
securely monopolized by the trust (and in the domestic market only) between 1890 and 
1895 and Bonsacks made in New York, Dresden and Paris were widely available 
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internationally. Many less efficient but serviceable rival machines were successfully 
produced worldwide and profitably used by other cigarette companies. The French state 
monopoly licensed Bonsacks before Duke, but found their expenses of upkeep high, so 
also used slower Decouflé machines, which Duke also felt had sufficient promise to 
justify buying the US rights to pre-empt competitive use.
76 The Ikegai Ironworks, in 
Japan, had difficulty manufacturing western textile machinery designs to the required 
tolerances, but could turn out dozens of copied cigarette machines at ¥400 ($200) each by 
1899/1900.
77 
 The emphasis in the fable on the paper-wrapping part of the cigarette production 
process is, moreover, misleading. Speed was the impressive essence of that part, but 
cigarette manufacture was, in fact, one of the slowest of all contemporary manufacturing 
processes. It typically took one-and-a-half years – and sometimes three - to make a 
cigarette, from the initial leaf processing to the final packaging and dispatch to jobbing 
wholesalers. The largest capital cost of a cigarette manufacturer was thus tobacco stocks 
and work in progress, rather than factories and machinery, and the prized 
“manufacturing” skill was leaf blending.
78 Field’s choice of American Tobacco as his 
prime manufacturing example of the capital-saving bias of the modern corporation is 
therefore particularly inapposite: the Bonsack’s saving of capital was infinitesimal.
79 
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Moreover, contemporary technical manuals emphasize the wide range of other 
mechanical contrivances for processes like curing, drying, compressing, stemming, 
fermenting, ageing, conditioning, damping, stoving, cooling and cutting leaf (processes 
common to other tobacco products), saucing, twisting and shaping plug, pulverizing snuff, 
and the final packaging (which again was common to the whole range of branded tobacco 
goods, with a variety of different proprietary technologies for packing).
80 In cigar-making 
there were also important productivity gains from reorganizing table-top work-flow in 
teams and ancillary equipment for handworkers.
81 The importance of machinery 
innovations thus depends on three factors: the efficiency of the machine compared with 
alternatives, its application horizontally to other sectors of tobacco manufacture, and its 
proportionate importance vertically in the extended process of manufacturing. 
 The Bonsack performed well on the first, not at all in the second and modestly in 
the third respect. We can measure its overall impact more precisely in 1889, when Duke 
discontinued hand-rolling. That still meant employing 350 girls on making and packing 
the cigarettes, in addition to the workers in the earlier stages of tobacco preparation, so 
the impact on total employment was less than the 48:1 ratio of the output of one machine 
to one skilled handworker would suggest. The early machines required a loader, an 
operator and a catcher, though this was eventually reduced to one, or, on faster machines, 
two attendants, with the help of a skilled development engineer. His annual commission, 
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equivalent to the wages of 70 girls in 1889,  negated some of  the savings, but the local 
women and girls now employed were paid less than half as much as the skilled immigrant 
males that Duke had employed on hand-rolling. Duke’s twenty four Bonsacks of 1889, 
producing 834 million cigarettes, were replacing 1,080 hand-rolling jobs.
82   
The industry-wide labor-saving impact in the 1880s of all sources of productivity 
change - including such factors as learning-by-doing as well as increased mechanization 
– can be obtained by applying the labor productivity levels for tobacco manufacturing in 
the 1879 census to the tobacco output levels of the 1889 census and comparing the result 
with the actual 1889 employment levels. The total labor saving over the decade was 
34,308 workers in cigars and cigarettes and 35,471 in other tobacco, so Duke’s Bonsacks, 
saving the work of 1,080 hand-rollers, contributed 1.5% of the productivity improvement 
in the whole US tobacco manufacturing industry in the 1880s. If half the cigarettes made 
by the other members of the combination of 1890 were from Bonsacks operated as 
efficiently, these machines and Duke’s accounted for 3.7% of the industry’s labor 
productivity gains. This was less than their share of tobacco sales, so their productivity 
achievement, even with a generous allowance for other machinery innovations used, is 
unlikely to be much above the industry average. This contribution could have increased 
in the following decades, with increased efficiency of the Bonsacks, or of the derivative 
Standard machines manufactured by the trust. However, as the invention was only one 
part of the production process of a product whose initially small share of domestic US 
leaf tobacco use peaked at just over 6% in 1896 before declining to below 3% for several 
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years after 1901 (when Duke sold fewer cigarettes in the USA than in 1890), not 
regaining its 1896 level until 1911, it is difficult to envisage the number becoming very 
large in the three decades following the 1881 patent.
83 The pre-war story of improving 
productivity in tobacco manufacturing is clearly more accurately, if less picturesquely, 
told as one of widespread and pervasive advance on a broad front of mechanical 
contrivances, at least in the USA. 
 Bonsacks were ten times more important for Britain, with twice as many 
machines installed in a tobacco market less than one-fifth the size. As we saw in Table 2, 
cigarettes – overwhelmingly made on American-designed Bonsacks and Standards - 
accounted in 1912 for 42% of UK tobacco sales. Several decades later, when cigarettes 
achieved that market penetration in the USA, new inventions were eclipsing the 
pioneering American technology of the fable: Bonsacks were obsolescent and were being 
replaced by Molins machines (with speeds in excess of 1,000 cigarettes a minute), using a 
technology developed by Cuban-American immigrants to Britain, financed by Imperial 
Tobacco.
84 Cigarettes in their final, and curiously belated, triumph in the USA were 
largely manufactured by imported technology, just as their earlier, precocious triumph in 
Britain had been based on the American Bonsack. 
American Tobacco may not have been able to outstrip the French monopoly’s 
productivity in manufactured tobacco overall, or British productivity in cigarettes, and 
the behavior that led to this, it has been noted, has, in other industries, been seen as 
distinctively European. One major difference with European economies is nonetheless 
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evident: these factors prevented America forging ahead, but they did not lead to falling 
far behind. If the USA got some things wrong in this industry, there was still something 
that kept its productivity nearer to the European leaders than they themselves were to 
higher American productivity in manufacturing generally. This appears to have owed 
only a modest amount to the technological prowess of Bonsack (who sold more machines 
abroad) or to the visible hand of Duke (whose post-1895 actions were often negative). It 
can as plausibly be traced to productivity advances achieved earlier by the traditional 
family tobacco firms that the trust took over. Perhaps some is due also to the 
independents who still accounted for most tobacco manufacturing value added in the 
USA. We do not know what caused the collective performance of these many 
contributors: perhaps it was the positive selection bias implicit in the choices Europeans 
made when becoming Americans; perhaps market competition was (in cigars and, until 
quite late, elsewhere) still working well in an unusually large and increasingly integrated 
US market; perhaps this industry was infused with the go-getting business culture that 
made immigrants to New York more entrepreneurial than culturally identical immigrants 
to London; and perhaps high US wages (driven by resource abundance and other 
industrial successes) induced higher work effort in tobacco as well.
85 There was, as 
Marshall put it in a different context, “something in the air” in America that drove even 
its mediocre performers like those in manufactured tobacco to levels that could still look 
a relatively well-performing Europe in the face. 
 
                                       The roots of Whig error 
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           The story I have told diverges somewhat from the traditional fable of American 
Tobacco, and it is worth asking why an evidently misleading narrative has held currency 
for so long. Much of this is due to the false dichotomies of the “robber baron” tradition 
(and of allergic reactions to it) that inhibit recognition that businessmen like Duke have 
both negative and positive effects. Technical innovation, economies of scale, monopoly 
prices, overweening ambition, large failed strategic bets, greed and predatory behavior 
are often bedfellows. It is not easy to conclude where the balance of advantage to the 
public interest (or even to stockholders) lies, and any historian is strongly tempted to 
duck balanced judgment in favor of a clear narrative theme. The problem is certainly not 
systematic or deliberate falsehood, for the canon of the fable rests on a factual narrative 
that is eerily accurate in detail, but misleading in substance.  
           The fable can most obviously be faulted for sins of omission. Evidence selection 
favors the relentless narration of an upbeat, one-sided story of successful American 
implementation of modernization and managerial integration, led by cigarettes. Where 
there is no clear statistical evidence – such as on whether Duke employed proportionately 
more professional managers in his cigarette enterprises than Wills - narrative details are 
selectively piled up to create the, possibly false, impression that he did; where there is 
statistical evidence, it is rarely cited. The fable tells us that Duke’s take-off into mass 
production was facilitated by the reduction of the cigarette tax in 1883 (which is true), but 
not how dramatic were the effects of the 1897/8 reversals of that tax cut. The fable tells 
us that Duke’s marketing innovations were essential for transforming the industry using 
the Bonsack (which is true), but not that he then presided over a decade-long stagnation   44
of the US cigarette industry, which compromised the extent of the machine’s use. The 
fable tells us that the cigar was a diversion of the trust’s strategy (which, in a sense, it 
was), but not why it was central to Duke’s vision, nor that cigar employment, revenues, 
R&D spending and output greatly exceeded those for cigarettes. The fable tells us that 
Duke attained the massive sales total of five billion sticks in the USA (which he did), but 
not that the British, German, Japanese and Russian cigarette industries (and the American 
cigar industry) had done so earlier, nor that this contrasts with a normally higher U.S. 
rank in mass market, consumer goods and transforming, machine technologies. The fable 
tells us that British managers were from old-established tobacco families (which is true), 
but not that this was the norm everywhere (except state monopolies), nor that the 
business performance of the old, pre-trust tobacco families, and of the Wills -and later the 
Reynolds - families in modern marketing and technology, was overwhelmingly positive. 
The fable tells us that Imperial Tobacco formed a price umbrella that induced 
“gentlemanly” competition from new entrants (and new entry there was, even if the, 
endearingly stereotypical adjective’s meaning is unclear), but not that American 
Tobacco’s more ample price umbrella did so far more (so whether the more numerous US 
entrants were “ungentlemanly” remains an unresolved mystery). The fable tells us that 
German producers developed no really strong cigarette brand (which is true), but not that 
Duke’s post-1900 product differentiation strategy led to similarly low sales for the top 
American brands. The fable misrepresents the historical contingencies faced by the actors, 
and the knowledge and constraints within which they operated, presenting historical 
outcomes as the linear product of the modernizing intentions of far-seeing professional 
businessmen, rather than of more complex and somewhat less unidirectional interactions   45
and processes, in which old and new struggled in the uncertain, uncharted strategic space 
of the messy present, to produce outcomes that were often unanticipated. 
             These biases mirror those analysed by critics of the Whig interpretation of history 
in the political sphere, with the heroic visible hand of corporate management taking the 
place of liberty and democracy in the Whig fable and driving a similar, grotesquely 
partisan, airbrushing of the evidence.
86 The worlds in which both fables prospered were 
worlds in which a fundamental truth (whose triumph and desirability were being peddled) 
was so self-evident that it was easy to read back into the historical evidence things that 
simply were not there. Historical explanation becomes compellingly easy if the goodies 
can, however capriciously and anachronistically, be labelled “professional” (or “Whig”), 
while the baddies can be tagged “family” (“Tory”) with parallel arbitrariness. It helps 
also if we use hindsight to endow historical persons with a clear vision of the future they 
are creating: narratives are more intuitively appealing when the characters know where 
they are headed (though real life is rarely like that). The criticism is not of the objects of 
the fablers’ praise (there is nothing wrong with liberty, or with good management), but of 
misplaced zeal to propagate what are profoundly unhistorical, predestinarian myths about 
the origins of what happened later. The USA really was in the 1960s the world’s leading 
manufacturer of cigarettes (and of very much else), and the job of the business historian 
was to demonstrate the inexorable path of virtuous progress to that end point promoted by 
America’s vital few. 
                                                 
86 Butterfield, Whig Interpretation.  This is a pervasive problem in business history, extending well beyond 
the present case, see Hannah, “Marshall’s Trees”; Lamoreaux, Raff and Temin, “Against Whig History.”   46
              The factual errors that this imperative induced are the most revealing (because 
unconscious) indicators of bias, even among the most skilled business historians. For 
example, Alfred D. Chandler Jnr., in a rare slip, credits the post-dissolution American 
Tobacco Company, rather than R. J. Reynolds, with the Camel revolution.
87 This – of 
course, unwittingly - fits his thesis more comfortably than the truth: that the return to the 
core mass production strategy that actually put the USA back on its path to later global 
dominance (and forced American Tobacco to change its own cigarette strategy) was 
devised by a company that earlier operated as an unusually independent subsidiary of the 
trust; was largely impervious to Duke’s strategic prejudices; and was run by an old 
established North Carolina tobacco family that knew its marketing, but had no previous 
experience of manufacturing cigarettes. They also rejoiced in the dissolution of the trust: 
“Watch me and see if I don’t give Buck Duke hell!” a North Carolina journalist reported 
Richard J. Reynolds saying.
88 The fablers, predictably, can see in that antitrust dissolution 
(for Reynolds – and US consumers - a liberation from the dead hand of the tobacco trust) 
at best a regrettable intervention that slowed the development of a fine corporation by 
compromising its competitive advantage.
89 
             Of course, all historical narratives require the selection of evidence and the reader 
might legitimately enquire why she should believe the present story rather than the 
traditional fable. The evidence base is hardly new: almost all the sources quarried here 
were published decades ago and were available to – indeed, widely cited by - the 
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fablers.
90 One advantage of the present version is that it rests on a reasonably firm 
statistical base, which is at least a discipline on authorial bias, albeit (of course) not a 
foolproof cure. By contrast, the fablers simply assumed an uncomfortably large amount 
of their story of American leadership ought to be true, without the need to provide 
evidence
91. On the whole, historians should favor accounts that explain what happened, 
over alternative narratives that, however compellingly, explain something that did not 
happen. 
             Not the least of the damage done by the fable was that it asked misplaced 
questions. It also hid from sight some of the issues addressed here: for example, what 
happens to international productivity differences when American consumers behave like 
Europeans and a monopolistic trust reinforces their diverse tastes, while French and 
Japanese state monopolists use their visible hand to drive the standardization of consumer 
demand. This perspective enables us better to understand the contingencies and trade-offs 
in the economic decisions faced by the businesses, governments, NGOs and consumers 
that, in revealingly different ways, drove these societies’ diverse choices. It also exorcises 
some of the sillier stereotypes of cultural and technological determinists. 
              The stage was set by 1912 for one of the world’s most interesting - but still 
largely unexplored - natural experiments in industrial economics. There was an unusually 
level playing field – in terms of initial productivity levels and technical potential - 
between all countries. The global tobacco industry as it actually existed after the antitrust 
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break-up of 1911 provided a remarkable laboratory of industrial organization, prompting 
questions on state versus private ownership, on monopoly versus oligopoly, and on 
nationally-owned versus multinational enterprises. We see glimpses of the outcome in the 
private sector: the new US multi-firm oligopoly that replaced American Tobacco 
overtook the productivity levels of Britain’s Imperial Tobacco in the inter-war years. Yet, 
despite its growing relative inefficiency, Imperial generated such high monopoly profits 
that it became the second most valuable firm on the world’s stock exchanges, until 
Britain also adopted an antitrust policy.
92 If this article succeeds in refocusing attention 
on such questions of comparative industrial organization that really require analysis, it 
will have succeeded in its major purpose. We might then be able to construct a new 
business fable which serves the true purpose of the genre: to illuminate rather than 
obfuscate the issues. 
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